SOME PHASES OF THE PROBLEM OF 
PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER 
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 


BY 

FRANK BURR MARSH 


Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1913, Volume I, pages 111-125 



WASHINGTON 

1915 




































































































































































SOME PHASES OF THE PROBLEM OF 
PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER 
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 


BY 

FRANK BURR MARSH 


Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1913, Volume I, pages 111-125 



WASHINGTON 

1915 



JC « 5 






VI. SOME PHASES OF THE PROBLEM OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
UNDER THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. 


By FRANK BURR MARSH, 

Instructor in the University of Texas. 


Ill 








SOME PHASES OF THE PROBLEM OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
UNDER THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. 


By Frank Burr Marsh. 


That the expansion of the Roman Republic was somewhat irregu¬ 
lar and haphazard, that its provinces were acquired piecemeal, one 
here, one there, has long been recognized. That the senate was, 
upon the whole, opposed to expansion has likewise been recognized, 
and the motive attributed to the senate has usually been the inde¬ 
pendence of the governors and the difficulty of controlling them. 
Yet there are some features of the story which this motive would 
hardly seem to explain and which, perhaps, have been too little 
noticed. 

The first of these is the intermittent character of Roman expan¬ 
sion. In a relatively short space of time Rome annexed several prov¬ 
inces, and then for a number of years no additions were made to 
her empire. A brief table will, perhaps, make this clearer. From 
241 B. C. to 197 B. C., during a period of 44 years, Rome annexed x 
four provinces. Then from 197 B. C. to 146 B. C., during a period 
of 51 years, no new territories were acquired. From 146 B. C. to 
121 B. C., during a period of 25 years, four more provinces were 
annexed. Then from 121 B. C. to 63 B. C., during a period of 58 
years, we find no further acquisitions. Thus the dominions of Rome 
advanced rapidly for 44 years, then stood still for 51 years, then 
advanced again for 25 years, then remained stationary for 58 years. 

The second peculiarity is that in the periods of rest, if they may be 
so described, the republic not only did not annex new provinces but \ 
strove earnestly to avoid it. It is not that opportunities were lack¬ 
ing, but that Rome refused to take advantage of them. One or two 
illustrations will suffice to make this clear. As was said above, in 
the 51 years between 197 B. C. and 146 B. O., Rome acquired no new 
territory. Yet in this time Rome carried on several important wars. 
From 200 B. C. to 196 B. C., Rome was engaged in the second 
Macedonian War. The result of that war was to place Greece and 
Macedon at her feet. Yet Rome contented herself with curtailing 
the power of Macedon and withdrew. Hardly had Rome withdrawn 
when in 192 B. C. Antiochus of Syria landed in Greece and Rome 
62513°—15-8 113 




114 


AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 


was forced into a war with him. The result of that war, which 
ended with the battle of Magnesia in 190 B. C., was to leave Rome 
mistress of Greece and Asia Minor. She gave up her conquests, 
annexed no territory, and withdrew her forces. In 171 B. C. Per¬ 
seus, king of Macedon, began a war of revenge on Rome. He was 
crushed at the battle of Pydna in 168 B. C., and Macedon lay help¬ 
less. Instead of annexing Macedon, which had so far caused her no 
less than three wars, Rome abolished the Macedonian monarchy, 
divided the country into four republics, and went home. Nineteen 
years after Pydna, the Macedonians revolted under a pretender in 
149 B. C. Then at length Rome yielded to the inevitable, and, as 
there was simply no other way of keeping Macedon quiet, she an¬ 
nexed it as a province at the beginning of the second period of ex¬ 
pansion. 

Another instance of this same aversion to conquest is furnished by 
the province of Narbonensis. After Rome had acquired possessions 
in Spain it was, as has been pointed out very often, inevitable that 
she should seek to get a land connection between Spain and Italy. 
In ancient times the Mediterranean could only be navigated with 
safety at certain seasons, and it would thus be unwise in Rome to rely 
wholly on communications by sea with her provinces in Spain. All 
historians have felt the force of these considerations. What has not 
been explained is why Rome remained blind to them for 76 years. 
Perhaps we may attribute it in part to the policy of no expansion 
which prevailed from 197 B. C. to 146 B. C. Once she resumed her 
forward policy, the province of Narbonensis was annexed and land 
communications with Spain assured. 

One more instance of Roman anti-imperialism. In the second 
period of stagnation—from an imperial standpoint—Rome received 
a bequest of Egypt. The last legitimate Ptolemy in his will be¬ 
queathed his kingdom to Rome. The senate promptly declined it. 
Mommsen has attempted to explain this attitude of the senate. 

Egypt [he says], by its peculiar position and its financial organization, placed 
in the hands of any governor commanding it a pecuniary and naval power, and 
generally an independent authority, which were absolutely incompatible with 
the suspicious and feeble government of the oligarchy: in this point of view it 
was judicious to forego the direct possession of the country of the Nile . 1 

Amplified and adapted to the special circumstances of each case, 
the reason given by Mommsen has been generally followed in ex¬ 
plaining the reluctance of the senate to annex new provinces. Jeal¬ 
ousy of the governor is the reason generally assigned, 2 yet this can 

1 Mommsen, “ History of Rome,” IV, 319. 

2 Thus Mr. Heitland, the latest historian of the Roman Republic, says: “ That the 
senate was anything but eager to annex provinces is clear enough, and was no doubt 
mainly due to the known difficulty of controlling distant governors.” Though he also 
points out some other considerations, such as the influence of the “ old Roman ” party 
and the wealth or poverty of the province, he seems to regard the reason given above as 
the chief cause of the senate’s attitude. “ The Roman Republic,” II, 187-188. 



ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 


115 


hardly be the whole explanation, since this motive would be likely 
to be as strongly felt at one time as another, while the reluctance of 
the senate to make new annexations is plainly much stronger at some 
periods than at others. Why, in other words, should the senate be 
more reluctant to annex territory before 146 B. C. than after that 
year? 

If we turn, however, to the constitutional problem which the gov¬ 
ernment of provinces presented to the Romans, an explanation is 
readily forthcoming. Previous to 146 B. C. the problem presented 
difficulties which it did not present after that year. And this ex¬ 
planation will apply equally at another point. The growth of Rome 
stopped in 121 B. C., but it so happens that the problem had again 
and in that year become difficult. It would seem, therefore, that this 
phase of Roman imperial development—namely, the constitutional 
problem presented by the government of the provinces—is worthy 
of a more careful consideration than it seems to have received. 

In this study I wish to concentrate attention wholly on the con¬ 
stitutional aspects of the problem, but without meaning in any way 
to deny that many other causes entered in in each particular case. 
It will be noted also that the motives here attributed to the senate 
are precisely of the sort that would not be brought forward openly 
in debate; hence the silence as to these motives of the ancient writers 
will, perhaps, not seem unduly strange. 

The key to the senate’s motives may, perhaps, be found in its 
composition and in its position in the Roman state. From early 
times the duty of making out the list of senators was intrusted to 
the censor. Soon, however, his freedom of choice began to be much 
restriced in practice. Certain persons, especially the ex-magistrates, 
were felt to have a moral if not a legal right to be placed upon the 
roll. This had come to be the case as early as 216 B. C., at least, for 
it is clear from the account which Livy gives us of the filling up of 
the senate after the battle of Cannae that there was a well-under¬ 
stood order which the censor was expected to follow in filling va¬ 
cancies in the senate. In the first place, all ex-consuls, all ex-praetors, 
and all ex-curule aediles were entitled to a seat. In the second place, 
all ex-aediles of the plebs, all ex-tribunes, and all ex-quaestors. In 
the third place only, citizens who had distinguished themselves in 
war but had not held office. In ordinary times such a rule must 
have left the censor but a slight liberty of choice, and, moreover, 
that range of choice must have been diminished with every increase 
in the number of the magistrates. A time would therefore come when 
any further increase in the number of the magistrates would, if these 
rules of 'precedence were allowed to stand , necessitate an increase in 
the size of the senate. 


116 


AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 


With a government so constituted how did the problem of govern¬ 
ing the provinces present itself and what solution was found? The 
first provinces of the Roman people were Sardinia and Sicily, taken 
for the purpose of keeping Carthage at a safe distance from Italy. 
Having annexed them, Rome was obliged to provide in some fashion 
for their government. A brief experience sufficed to convince the 
Romans that the tranquillity and safety of these provinces required 
the presence in them of a Roman governor armed with the imperium / 
that is, a Roman magistrate. But all the magistrates w r ere then 
fully occupied at Rome. The obvious course to follow under these 
circumstances was to increase the number of magistrates with im¬ 
perium and send the new magistrates to the provinces. As it was 
out of the question to increase the number of consuls, the praetors were 
chosen and the number increased from two to four. At the same 
time, as it was customary for a magistrate holding an independent 
command to be accompanied by a quaestor, the number of quaestors 
was increased to meet the new needs. 

This successfully solved the difficulty for the time being, and 
when, at the close of the Second Punic War, Rome acquired two new 
provinces in Spain, she resorted to the same method to secure gov¬ 
ernors. The number of praetors was now raised to 6 and that of the 
quaestors to 12. In the 51 years that followed Rome strove earnestly 
to avoid any new annexations. The reason would seem to be that 
it was impossible to provide governors for any new provinces by the 
method so far followed, and this for the reason that the number of 
magistrates did not admit of further increase. This was due to the 
hard and fast system which the republic had gradually built up. 
This system required, in the first place, that the candidates for the 
praetorship should have held the quaestorship and that the quaes- 
torship should confer a seat in the senate. There were now 6 praetors 
and 12 quaestors elected each year. If the number of the praetors 
was increased without increasing the number of quaestors two incon- 
veniencies followed: first, the new praetors could not be accom¬ 
panied by quaestors as custom required, and secondly, the freedom of 
the people in election was materially curtailed. If, on the other hand, 
the number of the quaestors was increased, then it followed that, 
either the number of the senate must be increased, or the rule giving 
the quaestor a seat in the senate must be set aside. Thus to carry the 
existing system further in any direction required an extensive re¬ 
adjustment of the constitutional machinery, and there was no one 
of sufficient width of vision and sufficient power to carry through 
such an adjustment against the outcry of those who would be ad¬ 
versely affected and against the strongly conservative instincts of the 
Roman people. 


ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 


117 


That the number of magistrates was now sufficient to fill the 
senate may be easily made clear. The number of quaestors was at 
this time 12 and the traditional number of the senate 300. Sulla, 
when he reorganized the Roman constitution, decided to increase the 
size of the senate from 300 to 500, 1 and to accomplish this he raised 
the number of the quaestors to 20. Now by a very simple arith¬ 
metical computation, if 20 quaestors would give a senate of 500, 
12 quaestors would give one of 300 members. We have, therefore, 
good grounds for believing that the number of magistrates did not 
admit of increase under the existing system. 

But why should not the existing system be changed? Either of 
two changes would have met the situation. On the one hand, the 
close association between the magistracy and the senate might be 
broken, or, on the other, the size of the senate might be increased. 
Neither change was in fact feasible, or, at least, neither could be 
made by anyone but a man of blood and iron, clothed with resistless 
power like Sulla, and, like him, prepared to ride roughshod over all 
opposition. It may be well to consider briefly the nature of the 
obstacles to change. 

The chief difficulty sprang from the fact that the Roman gov¬ 
ernment was no longer what it pretended to be. In law Rome was 
a democracy and had been one from the time when the plebeians 
had been accorded equal rights with the patricians. In fact, however, 
hardly had the patrician aristocracy been overthrown than a new 
patricio-plebeian aristocracy began to develop. This new nobility 
was composed of those families members of which had held curule 
office under the republic. The development was of course gradual, 
but already, in 217 B. C., Livy tells us that a tribune bitterly de¬ 
nounced the plebeian nobles and asserted that they began to look 
down upon the plebeians from the moment that they ceased to be 
despised by the patricians, and clamored for the election of a real 
plebeian consul, a new man; that is, one belonging to a family that 
had not before held office. 

We may, then, reasonably infer that the nobility was by this time 
a clearly marked class. If so, they would naturally view any change 
in the constitution from the standpoint of their own interests. Now, 
either of the changes suggested would have been injurious to the 
nobility. 

Since nobility was acquired by the holding of a magistracy, there 
would of necessity be a sufficient number of families already noble 
to hold the offices and fill the senate. Their obvious interest would 
consist in not allowing the number to become very much greater, 

1 This seems, at any rate, to have been the result of his reforms. See Willems, “ Le 
S<§nat de la Rgpublique Romaine,” I, 405, and his reconstructions of the senate of the 
earlier period. 



118 


AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 


and such was consistently their policy. Now, any attempt to increase 
the size of the senate was sure to encounter the bitter opposition of 
the nobles. An aristocracy tends alwaj^s to exclusiveness, and an 
increase in the size of the senate meant neither more nor less than 
an extensive creation of new peers. Twice in English history the 
House of Lords has stooped to bitter humiliation solely in order 
to avert such an event. But the Roman nobility itself controlled the 
size of the senate, and therefore no increase in the size of that body 
was in the least feasible. 

There remained the other alternative, namely, that of breaking 
the close connection between officeholding and a seat in the senate. 
The simplest plan in this direction would have been to provide for 
the election of special governors for the provinces and to provide 
that the holding of these offices should not confer a title to a seat. 
But this plan was likewise open to serious objection from the stand¬ 
point of the senate and the nobility, which used it as an organ of 
government. 

In the first place, a large part of the power and influence of the • 
senate sprang precisely from the fact that it concentrated in itself 
the whole official experience of the Roman world. Consuls and 
praetors must inevitably treat with respect the deliberate judgment 
of a body in which sat every Roman who had ever led an army or 
governed a province. Once let official knowledge accumulate out¬ 
side the senate and much of the senate’s influence was gone. This 
was a consideration absolutely vital to a body which, like the senate, 
ruled rather by influence than by legal right. 

Indirectly, too, such a proposal would be injurious to the nobles. 
In Roman minds there was the closest association between the magis¬ 
trates, the senate, and the nobility. A seat in the senate was one of 
the essential badges of the noble. Once create important magis¬ 
tracies which did not confer a seat there and you must raise up a 
new order to rival the existing nobles, and such a proposition was 
little likely to find favor at their hands. 

Still again, a considerable part of the senate’s control over the 
provincial governors lay in the fact that they were ipso facto sena¬ 
tors, and the opinions of their order, spoken through that body of 
which they were themselves a part, could not but weigh heavily 
with them. Break this connection, let the people name governors 
who have no direct personal interest in the supremacy of the senate, 
and you strike a direct blow at its power. Since already the senate 
found its control, great as it was, over the provinces too weak, it 
would scarcely have consented to a change that would have weakened 
it still more. 

One possibility, indeed, remained. If the connection between the 
lower and the higher magistracies was severed, the number of the 


ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 


119 


praetors could be increased. This could be done by making two 
changes—first, by ceasing to require the quaestorship to be held 
before the praetorship and by decreeing that the quaestorship should 
no longer confer a seat in the senate. But such a change would 
meet with little favor from the nobility. It would conflict with 
the conservative instincts of the Romans and with many private 
interests. As an example of these private interests the ordo quaesto- 
rius in the senate would be strongly opposed, and the ordo praetorim 
could hardly wish their numbers to be enlarged. 

But larger difficulties arose. One can scarcely fail to wonder at 
the ease with which the nobility were able to keep their monopoly 
of the offices. Why was it so rarely that “new men” could force 
their way into their ranks? It seems difficult not to suspect that 
the peculiar character of the office of quaestor worked silently in 
their favor. How this might be the case may easily be seen. The 
quaestorship was the first office to be held in an official career. Hence 
it was held early. Ordinarily it could be held at the age of 28. 
Thus a quaestor would usually be from 28 to 30. Now at the age of 
30 it would very rarely happen that a man had had an opportunity 
to do anything to attract general attention or make a mark for him¬ 
self by his own personality. If, therefore, two relatively unknown 
men were candidates for the office, and one of them bore a well-known 
name, that one would be nearly sure of being chosen. Hence it would 
easily happen that the nobles could secure it for the younger mem¬ 
bers of their families. If, now, it were made a necessary prelimi¬ 
nary to the higher offices, it would clearly throw them into the hands 
of the nobles. Looking at it from this point of view, we can readily 
understand why no proposal should have been made to change the 
rules that worked so well in favor of the dominant aristocracy. 

Hence, from whatever side the problem of providing more governors 
for new provinces might be approached, it was nearly impossible of 
solution in a sense agreeable to the senate. Is it, therefore, surpris¬ 
ing that the senate took the stand that there should be no new 
provinces to provide for, and that it directed the whole foreign policy 
of Rome with that end in view? In other words, the senate per¬ 
mitted the rapid expansion of the Roman Empire as long as the 
existing system could be expanded to meet the urgent needs of gov¬ 
ernment. When that point was reached and when any new annexa¬ 
tions required extensive readjustments, the senate called a halt. 

Yet, although the expansion of Rome could be, and was, stopped 
during some 50 years, the existing system could not be made per¬ 
manent. On the one hand, new annexations could not be forever 
avoided, and on the other, the system broke down from within. 

The growth of judicial business at Rome ended by demanding the 
retention there of more than two praetors, especially after the estab- 


120 


AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 


lishment of the standing court de Repetundis in 148 B. C., and the 
senate’s Macedonian policy having ended in an utter fiasco, that un- 
happy country was finally annexed at the same time that the de- 
’ ^ struction of Carthage placed Africa in the hands of the Romans. 
Thus the number of the provinces was increased to six, while but 
three praetors were available as governors. 

Faced by this situation, the senate threw the whole system of gov¬ 
erning by praetors overboard and worked out a new plan. This was 
rendered possible by a new and most significant development in the 
Roman constitution, namely, the rise of the promagistracy. 

The origin of the promagistracy was simple. In the early days 
of the republic, when the number of magistrates with imperium was 
very restricted, the state occasionally needed a larger number than 
there were. The right to prolong the imperium of a magistrate was 
originally exercised by the people, but during the period of the Great 
Wars the senate usurped it, as it usurped so many other powers of 
government. 

The convenience of this power for the senate in arranging for the 
government of the provinces was from the first great. Indeed, 
without it the government could scarcely have been carried on. The 
Roman state was equipped with only eight magistrates with im¬ 
perium —the two consuls and six praetors. Normally two praetors 
were kept in Rome and four sent to the four provinces then existing. 
But it sometimes happened that a magistrate with imperium was 
imperatively needed somewhere else. In this case the senate dis¬ 
patched one of the praetors and to replace him left one of the pro¬ 
vincial governors in office for a second year as a propraetor. This 
usage was the more easily established, as it was a regular rule of the 
constitution that a governor continued in office till his successor ar¬ 
rived to take over the government. Now, as each year the senate 
settled what provinces should be distributed by lot among the 
praetors, therefore, if they failed to designate one of the four regular 
provinces for this purpose, the praetor there in charge could not be 
superseded for another year. 

Thus the power which the senate had assumed of continuing in 
office at its discretion a consul or a praetor beyond his regular term 
supplied the element of elasticity required to make the rigid system 
workable. Since it was clearly a necessity, no serious objection seems 
to have been made to this assumption of power on the senate’s part. 
Once established as a legitimate part of the machinery of government 
to meet exceptional emergencies it came to be employed with increas¬ 
ing frequency. The more the steadily growing needs of the Roman 
state pressed upon the heavily burdened regular magistrates, the 
greater the temptation to relieve the pressure by the intervention of 
the promagistrates. 


ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 


121 


Thus, by the year 146 B. C. the promagistrate had come to be a 
frequent visitor in the Roman government. But up to that year he 
had always remained a visitor. That is, the use of a proconsul or 
propraetor was always looked upon as something exceptional—a tem¬ 
porary expedient to meet an unusual situation. In 146 B. C. the 
senate solved the problem of governing the increased number of 
provinces by turning the exception into the rule. Henceforth the 
promagistrate, instead of being a special office intended to meet an 
emergency, was a regular part of the ordinary constitution, and the 
provinces were governed not by magistrates but by promagistrates. 

This new method of administering the provinces had from some 
standpoints little to commend it. So far as the efficiency of the 
government was concerned, it was unqualifiedly bad. It made 
directly and powerfully for poor administration, and this for the 
simplest of reasons. If a man is elected to fill an office he can be 
chosen with some reference to fitness. But if a man is elected to one 
office and then when his term is over he is sent to fill some quite 
different office this becomes impossible. Every year the Roman 
people elected praetors to serve as judges in Rome; when their year 
of judicial service there was over the senate shipped them off to 
govern provinces and command armies. They were necessarily 
chosen without the smallest reference to their qualifications for 
these new duties. Of course, some of them, like Julius Caesar, were 
men of so versatile a genius that they could do almost anything 
and do it well; but such men were rare, and it necessarily happened 
that the majority were ill-adapted to their posts. As a result the 
provincial administration suffered and Rome suffered in consequence. 

Yet, whatever the demerits of the system from the standpoint of 
political science, from the standpoint of the nobles it had signal 
merits. It solved all the problems of administration and solved them 
in a way entirely agreeable to the senate. Its advantages may be 
summed up as four. It enabled the senate to relieve the congestion 
of business at Rome by keeping all six praetors there during their 
year of office. At the same time it furnished enough governors to 
meet the increased demands, as all six, together with the two retiring 
consuls, were available for provincial governorships. It did both 
these things without increasing the number of the magistrates, and 
hence the size of the senate, and, in the fourth place, it did so with¬ 
out disturbing any of the existing rules and regulations. 

The year 146 B. C. may be taken, then, as marking the beginning 
of a new form of provincial administration. Henceforth the consuls 
and praetors were to serve their year of office in Italy, and, when that 
was over, were to go out for a second year as proconsuls and pro¬ 
praetors to govern the provinces. But the year is significant for 
another reason. It marks the beginning of a second period of ex- 


122 


AMERICAN- HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 




pansion, and this, in part at least, because of the new system. If we 
have been justified in concluding that from 197 B. C. to 146 B. C. 
the senate was seriously opposed to annexing new provinces because 
it had no governors to put in charge, after 146 B. C. this reason ceased 
to apply. While, under the old system, the senate had at most only 
four praetors to send out as governors, under the new there were at 
least eight promagistrates available for service. As after 146 B. C. 
there were only six provinces the senate had no longer the same mo¬ 
tive for resisting expansion. Yet the expansion, which was possible 
under the new arrangement, was distinctly limited. The new system 
would provide for the government of eight provinces, and there a 
halt must be called or the system would break down. 

Yet the new limit of growth imposed by the number of available 
governors was not quite so rigid as in the case of the former system. 
The same power which extended the imperium of a magistrate for one 
year could as easily extend it again. If, therefore, some of the gov¬ 
ernors were allowed to serve for two years instead of one a number of 
provinces somewhat in excess of eight could be provided for. Yet 
such an extension must have appeared, from the senate’s standpoint, 
dangerous. Two years’ service in a province might give time for a 
bad governor to do serious mischief and for a good one to become 
dangerously strong. In a single year a governor could hardly in¬ 
augurate and carry far a policy contrary to the wishes of the senate, 
wdiereas in two he would be in a far more independent position and 
might irrevocably commit the state. Moreover, it tended directly to 
making the governor less responsible for his actions. It was an estab¬ 
lished principle of the republican constitution that a magistrate could 
not be called to answer for his conduct while he remained in office. 
It was, therefore, a sound constitutional principle which insisted upon 
an interval between offices so that the magistrate should become again 
a private citizen and as such liable to prosecution for any illegal acts. 
To secure this, the rule had been established that two years must 
elapse before a man who had held one office was eligible for another. 
If he were allowed to spend both years as the governor of a province, 
this rule might be practically annulled. If his governorship, how¬ 
ever, was limited to one year, the purpose of the rule would still be 
attained, as there would still remain one year which must be spent in 
private life. 

It results from this that, while the senate might have no grave 
objection to an increase in the number of the provinces to eight, it 
would not be willing to see the number increase much beyond that 
point. This, indeed, seems to have been its actual policy. Though 
not exactly imperialistic, it offered little opposition to expansion be¬ 
tween the year 146 B. C. and 121 B. C. During these years besides 
the two provinces of Macedon and Africa, annexed at its beginning, 


ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 


123 


two other provinces, Asia and Narbonensis, were acquired. At 
this point the limit of the new system had been reached, and we 
find the senate once more strongly opposed to expansion. That body 
had offered little opposition when Asia was annexed under the will 
of Attalus of Pergamum, but it promptly rejected Egypt offered 
them by the will of Ptolemy Alexander. For the 58 years following 
the annexation of Narbonensis the growth of the empire was prac¬ 
tically arrested. Indeed, if the existing system was to be maintained, 
the senate had little choice. It had at its disposal only eight gov¬ 
ernors. Yet situations continually arose to call for one or more of 
these in places that did not normally require a resident governor. 
When this happened some of the governors had to be given a second 
year in their provinces, and if this practice were once allowed to 
spread and to become the regular usage of the constitution, serious 
consequences might follow. In fact, the number of the provinces 
already amounted to ten. Neither Cisalpine Gaul nor Cilicia seem to 
have been regarded at first as among the regular provinces, yet they 
ended by making themselves such. A word concerning them may 
not be out of place. 

The conquest of Cisalpine Gaul was a long and gradual process. 
It was begun as far back as 200 B. C. But the Gauls offered a 
prolonged though somewhat intermittent resistance. The surviving 
books of Livy furnish fairly complete information as to the regular an¬ 
nual assignments of provinces from 198 to 1GT B. C. The regular 
method at that time of governing a province was by a praetor, yet dur¬ 
ing these 31 years praetors were sent to Gaul only five times, with 3 
3 7 ears for which Livy gives us no information. On seven occasions 
consuls were dispatched to Gaul, so that in all there were not more 
than 12 or 15 years during which a regular magistrate was stationed 
in the province. The inference from this would seem to be clear. 
When Gaul was quiet it was not thought to require a special gov¬ 
ernor, and when it was turbulent a praetor or a consul was sent to 
deal with it. This was probably rendered easier by the troubles in 
Liguria, which called for the presence in the north of Italy of one or 
both the consuls with a good deal of regularity. If there was a 
consul in Liguria, he could doubtless keep an eye on the Po Valley 
and see that all went well. This was the case in at least eight years 
where no magistrate was sent to Gaul itself. 

Thus we may reasonably doubt whether the senate viewed the 
Cisalpine province as a regular charge upon its supply of governors. 
This seems the more reasonable as the Romans planted numerous 
colonies in the Po Valley, something not done in any of the other 
provinces. We may, perhaps, conclude that for a long time the 
senate did not regard Cisalpine Gaul as requiring the regular pres¬ 
ence of a governor. Gradually the irregular presence of one became 


124 


AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 


so frequent as to be regular, and a ninth province had usually to be 
provided for. 

The province of Cilicia was in a somewhat similar case. In 103 
B. C. the Bomans established a military post in this region. We 
may well doubt if they had at that time any idea of acquiring a 
province, since the territory was very restricted in extent. Yet here, 
too, it gradually became evident that the conditions were such as 
made the presence of a governor necessary during the greater part 
of the time. 

If Cisalpine Gaul and Cilicia were made part of the regular prov¬ 
inces, the limits of the promagistracy were already exceeded. This 
was remedied for the senate by Sulla, who, during his dictatorship, 
increased the number of praetors to eight, thus making the number of 
promagistrates each year available balance the number of Provinces. 
This policy of increasing the number of the magistrates was possible 
to Sulla since, in the first place, he was clothed with irresistible 
power, and, in the second, because, disregarding the feelings of the 
nobility, he- created peers wholesale by increasing the number of the 
senate. 

In spite of Sulla’s masterful recasting of the republican system 
the same considerations continued to apply. The whole policy of the 
senate, as he reorganized it, was antiexpansionist. The underlying 
motives of the senate were doubtless still the same. There were no 
governors available to send out to new provinces, and hence the senate 
was resolved not to assume new burdens. Yet in spite of senate and 
nobility new responsibilities arose and could not be evaded. Since 
the senate would not meet them, the people intervened. Their 
method of solution was by intrusting sweeping powers to popular 
favorites. For this the incompetent administration, which was the 
necessary fruit of the existing system, furnished not only the excuse 
but the provocation. With the fall of the reactionary regime of 
' Sulla, and even from his death, we enter on the period of great com¬ 
mands, extending over several provinces and intrusted for a term 
of years to the great leaders of the day. This system ended, and 
could end, only in the empire, but with that development we need 
not here concern ourselves. 

What it has been the aim of this study to point out is the close 
. connection between the constitutional problem raised by the neces¬ 
sity of providing governors for the provinces and the foreign policy 
of the republic. We have seen that the difficulty was first met by 
increasing the number of the magistrates invested with the imperium. 
As long as this method could be followed the Roman state expanded, 
but when any further increase tended to break up the republican 
constitution as it then was, there came a pause. Then, for a time, 
the senate successfully opposed all further expansion, until at length 


ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 


125 


such expansion could no longer be resisted. By that time, however, 
the promagistrate had become so far familiar to the Roman mind 
that the use of the promagistracy as a regular part of the machinery 
of government was possible. This device of substituting the pro¬ 
magistrate for the magistrate made possible another period of ex¬ 
pansion, and when this, too, had been carried to the limit the senate 
again sought by all means to avoid a forward policy. When, how¬ 
ever, a new policy of imperialism was forced upon the state the con¬ 
stitutional problem could be met only by means fatal, in no long 
time, to the existence of the republic. So long as the crude and com¬ 
plicated municipal institutions of Rome could, in some sort, be ad¬ 
justed to meet the crying needs of the day the republic could con¬ 
tinue; when such adjustment had become impossible, or, at any rate, 
too difficult for the statesmen of the time, then, in spite of the pro¬ 
tests of idealists and the daggers of patriots, it had to cease and 
another system took its place. 

The irony of the situation lay in the fact that the machine had 
become inadequate to the needs of the empire that it was forced to 
govern. After the conquests of Pompey in the East and of Caesar 
in Gaul there were at least 14 provinces to be provided for and only 
10 promagistrates. Yet any attempt to increase the number of 
governors available must necessitate an extensive readjustment of 
the whole machine of government. To any such readjustment the 
nobility were bitterly opposed. From this it followed that the re¬ 
public, if saved at all, would have to be saved in despite of the oppo¬ 
sition of the republicans. For a time the senate might get around 
the difficulties of its position by virtue of the fact that the people 
had over its head intrusted several provinces to one governor; but 
this was a device which if persisted in was fatal, and yet there was 
no way back to a normal system except by the intervention of a 
second Sulla. But Caesar was not a Sulla and the machine stopped 
forever. 




































